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Abstract
Line map, an invertible, two-dimensional chaotic encryption algorithm was introduced re-
cently. In this paper, we propose several weaknesses of the method based on standard
cryptanalytic attacks. We perform a side-channel attack by observing the execution time
of the encryption algorithm and successfully reduce the key space by a factor of 104 for
a key length of 16 digits. We find the existence of equivalent keys which reduce the key
space by a significant margin, even in the absence of any attack. Also, we find that the
ciphertext is not sensitive to small changes in the plaintext due to poor diffusion.
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1 Introduction
The need for fast and secure encryption schemes for bulky data such as audio, images
and video has prompted the advance of chaos-based encryption schemes over traditional
schemes, which make use of the inability to perform factorization of large numbers (RSA)
or to solve the discrete logarithm problem (El Gamal) in a fast and efficient manner. Recent
advances like distributed computing, quantum computing and new advances in algorithmic
number theory can potentially make such traditional schemes totally unusable in the future.
In contrast, chaos-based encryption schemes are fast and easily realized in both hardware
and software, which makes it more suitable for data encryption.
The two basic properties of chaotic systems are the sensitivity to initial conditions
and mixing. Sensitivity to initial conditions means that when a chaotic map is iteratively
applied to two initially close points, the iterates quickly diverge, and bear no correlation
after a few iterations. Sensitivity to parameters causes the properties of the map to change
quickly when the parameters on which the map depends are mildly disturbed. Mixing is
the tendency of the system to quickly confuse small portions of the state space into an
intricate network so that two nearby points in the system totally lose the correlation they
once shared and get scattered all over the state space. These properties are the key aspects
of chaotic maps that have allowed them to be used to generate complicated patterns of
pixels and the gray levels in an image.
Traditionally, there are two ways in which chaos is used in image encryption schemes: 1)
1-D chaotic maps like logistic map and generalizations of logistic map [1] to generate pseudo-
random bits with desired statistical properties to realize secret encryption operations. 2)
2-D chaotic maps like Arnold’s cat map, Baker map or fractal-like curves to realize secret
permutations of digital images. The first approach has been widely used to design chaotic
stream ciphers, while the second is specially employed by chaos-based block encryption
schemes. (Refer Table 1 for a brief overview on some recent chaos-based image encryption
schemes and their properties).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section gives a brief description
of the original line map algorithm and its use in encrypting and decrypting images as
developed in [2]. Section 3 points out to the major weaknesses of the algorithm and gives
a list of attacks that can be performed on the scheme owing to the weaknesses discussed,
Section 4 introduces the Joint Entropy function as a plausible metric for quantifying how
well an algorithm or chaotic map, makes the encrypted image look random and Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Line map algorithm
The line map is an invertible, two-dimensional chaotic mapping introduced by Feng [2].
It achieves lossless encryption with a good sensitivity to change in key and exhibits good
mixing properties. The line map proposed has two forms namely the left line map and the
right line map. Here each pixel of a line perpendicular to the diagonal is inserted between
the adjacent two pixels of the next line perpendicular to the diagonal. It is suggested that
to arrange the original image in to a row of pixels is a process of stretching and rearranging
the row of pixels to image is an operation of folding. From the point of view of these
stretching and folding operations, the line map is chaotic, similar to the Baker map or the
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Table 1: A brief survey of the chaotic image encryption literature
Scheme Strengths Weakness and known at-
tacks
Scharinger J “Fast en-
cryption of image data
using chaotic Kol-
mogorov Flows” [3]
Unstable dynamics of the
kolmogorov flow ensures
good mixing.
Size of key space depends on
size of image.
Fridrich J “Symmetric
ciphers based on two-
dimensional chaotic
maps” [4] [5]
Cat map: high parame-
ter sensitivity; Baker and
Standard map: Large
key space
Catmap: small key space;
Baker and Standard map:
Higher computational com-
plexity. [6]
Yen et al. “Bit Re-
circulation Image En-
cryption” (BRIE) [7]
[8]
Low hardware and com-
putational complexity,
high encryption speed,
no distortion
Weak keys, vulnerable to
known/chosen-plaintext at-
tacks, since a mask image
that is equivalent to secret
key can be derived from
a pair of plain-image and
cipher-image. [9]
Yen et al. “Chaos
key based algorithm”
(CKBA) [10]
Low computational
complexity, Good mix-
ing/confusion in pixels
Weak to chosen and known
plaintext attacks, security to
brute-force attack is also ques-
tionable. [11]
Yen et al. “Hierarchi-
cal Chaotic Image En-
cryption”(HCIE) [12]
[13] [14]
Parallel and pipelined re-
alization of the scheme is
possible, hence high en-
cryption speed
Permutation-only scheme.
Cannot resist chosen plaintext
attack. [15]
Mao et al. “Sym-
metric image encryp-
tion based on 3D cat
maps” [16]
Large key space, good
key sensitivity and resis-
tance to statistical and
differential attacks.
Insensitivity to changes in
plaintext and key stream gen-
erated by any key,poor diffu-
sion function. [17] [18]
Mao et al. “Fast
image encryption
scheme based on the
3D chaotic baker
maps” [19]
Large key space Insensitivity to changes in
plaintext and key stream gen-
erated by any key,poor diffu-
sion function. [18]
2
Cryptanalysis of the Line map
Cat map.
Let A(i, j) be a square image matrix; l(i), i = 1, 2, . . . , N.N is a one dimensional vector
mapped from A(i, j) and fix(X) is a function which rounds the elements of X to the
nearest integers towards zero.The algorithm for the line map for square images is given by:
l
(
i−1∑
k=0
(4k − 1) + j + 1
)
= A
(
fix
(4i− j + 1)
2
, f ix
(j + 1)
2
)
j = 1, 2, . . . , 4i− 1
i = 1, 2, . . . , f ix(N
2
)
l

fix(N2 )∑
k=0
(4k − 1) +
i−1∑
k=fix(N
2
)
(4N + 1− 4fix(
N + 1
2
)− 1 + j

 = A(fix(4i− j + 1)
2
, f ix
(j + 1)
2
)
j = 1, 2, . . . , 4N + 1− 4i
i = fix(N
2
) + 1, f ix(N
2
) + 2, . . . , N
The equations above denote the left line map algorithm.To obtain the right line map,first
the image has to be mirrored and then the left line map is applied to the mirrored image.
This scheme can be extended to rectangular images according to the size of the image.
Using the line map, the encryption of an image is done as follows: the key for encryption
is the number of times the left and right line map is applied on the image in succession.
For example, a key like ‘321’ means that the image is mapped to another encrypted image
through 3 iterations of the left line map, 2 iterations of the right line map and 1 iteration
of the left line map in that order successively.
For image decryption, we use the inverse line map algorithm, which is straight away, the
reverse of the encryption algorithm. When the correct key is entered, the original image
is obtained without any loss of information. The line map shows good sensitivity to the
changes in the key. To further enhance the security of the algorithm, it is proposed that
the gray level values substitution is used together with the line map using XOR operation
of the pixel co-ordinates (i and j). This flattens the histogram of the encrypted image,
which resists plaintext attack according to [2].All the results throughout this paper have
been tested using a 128× 128 Lena image (Figure 1(a)).
3 Weaknesses
1. It is claimed in [2] that the key space for a key length of 64 bits (16 digits) is 1.84×1019.
This is actually not possible because the total number of expressible numbers through
16 digits is 1016 in a decimal number system. So the key space when key length (K)
is specified/known can be a maximum of only 10K .
2. There exists equivalent keys for the encryption operation as defined by the scheme. As
an example, it can be seen that cipher images resulting from keys 4, 103, 301, 202 and
1010101 all reduce to 4 successive iterations of the line map and are thus equivalent
(they produce the same encrypted image). Hence, even without any attack, the key
space is reduced by a considerable amount.
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3. It is also believed that the scheme can have infinite key length. Practically, since
different keys have different times of encryption, by doing a side channel attack (by
recording the time taken for line map algorithm), the key used can be localized to a
much smaller subset of the key space.
4. The diffusion operation defined by the scheme is weak. By diffusion we mean that,
if a change occurs in a pixel’s gray-level, then the change can cause greater changes
in other pixels resulting in a totally different cipher text after encryption. Thus,
greater the changes caused by diffusion process, higher is the plaintext sensitivity of
the cryptosystem, and the system is more secure against differential attack. In this
scheme, the XOR of i and j with the plaintext affects only one pixel, which makes the
scheme vulnerable to differential attacks. Moreover, the diffusion operation is very
loosely defined: “In order to enhance the security, the gray level values substitution
is used together with the line map using exclusive OR operation of i and j”(quoted
from Feng [2]). Here, the XOR operation if assumed to be made between the current
pixel value and the i and j coordinates of the pixel, has poor diffusion and affects
only one pixel.
3.1 Side-Channel attack
In [2], they claim that since the length of the key has no limit, its key space can be infinitely
large according to security requirements. Though this feature has been highlighted as an
important advantage of this scheme there are a few glaring weaknesses in using it. The
encryption scheme takes variable time to encrypt the image for different keys. So a side-
channel attack done by calculating the time taken for varying key lengths greatly reduces
the key space for a brute force attack. We take an example of key length=3. There are only
103 possible keys of key length 3. But among those, a key like ‘123’(total number of times
of application of either of the line maps is 7) takes a lot more time to encrypt/decrypt an
image than a key like ‘111’(total number of iterations is 3).This is a grave weakness as it
gives away the number of iterations of the line map involved in the encryption/decryption
process. The graph (Figure 2) shows the variation of time taken for encryption with respect
Figure 1: (a) Original Image. (b) Encrypted image (Key:1234567891123456).
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to the total number of iterations due to the key. From the linear slope, and intercept on
the axes, one can narrow down the key search for brute force attack drastically. We derive
the following results:
1. The upper bound on the size of key space after we have an estimate of the total
number of iterations (N) with maximum error e can be derived from the theory of
compositions [20] in number theory (Appendix). (It includes all possible keys of all
possible key lengths for sum of iterations varying between N − e and N + e). When
we sum over all possible key lengths (K) for this condition,the key space is given by∑N+e
n=N−e
∑N+e
K=ceil(n/9)
(
N−1
K−1
)
2. For the case where the key length is exactly known (say equal to K), the brute force
attack key search is reduced from 10K keys to
(
N−1
K−1
)
= (N−1)!
(K−1)!(N−K)!
keys.
Note that the given estimate of key space does not take in to account the reduction
due to equivalent keys. In [2] a key like 1234567891123456 has been used as an example to
encrypt images (N = 67 andK = 16). Even though it is claimed that the key space for such
a key length is 1.84×1019, with a knowledge of the key length, it is actually reducible to
(
67
15
)
which equals 2.683×1014 – a reduction in key space by a factor of 104. Such a reduction in
key space makes the scheme extremely vulnerable against the computing facility available
at the attacker’s disposal (A key space K < 2100 = 1030 is generally agreed to be insecure
in the cryptography community [21])
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Figure 2: Execution time in seconds vs. sum of iterations (used in side-channel attack).
The experiments were done on a machine running sempron processor at 1.8 GHz and 256
MB RAM using MATLAB/Dev C++.
3.2 Chosen plain text attack
Even without a brute force attack, the line map scheme is vulnerable to a known/chosen
plaintext attack. According to Fridrich [4], one of the important requirements of a good
cryptosystem is not just sensitivity to the key, but also sensitivity to small changes in
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the plaintext. This means that changing one pixel in the plain-image should result in a
completely different cipher-image. This results when the pixel permutation and diffusion
operations are strong. The line map doesn’t possess this property and hence is vulnerable
in this regard. We changed the first pixel value (137 originally) of the first row of the image
to 0. The difference image (difference between original image encrypted and modified image
encrypted) is shown in Figure 3. We see that the difference is in one pixel only. This gives
a lot of opportunity to known/chosen plaintext attacks. For instance, if we choose two
images that differ in only one pixel and encrypt it using an unknown key, we can observe
from the difference image how the different pixel moves after each iteration, from which
the key can be recovered.
Figure 3: (a) Left: Image with only the first pixel different from the original image. (b)
Right: Difference image for key:1234567891123456.
4 Joint Entropy
Throughout our experiments with encryption and decryption of images, we have noticed
that there exists a need for a good metric to quantify the amount of randomness in the
pixel permutation and diffusion operations. These operations are necessary for any secure
encryption scheme and a definite way to characterize them will make comparison of the
existing schemes much easier. We propose the Joint Entropy function of the image as a
metric. Joint Entropy of an image (assuming a gray image with 2L gray levels) is defined
as the number of bits required to represent every pair of adjacent pixels of the image at a
time (pairs being non-overlapping), averaged over the entire image. With our test image,
there are 256 gray levels, and hence the joint entropy for this image is found as follows:
we find the frequency of occurrence of all possible combination of gray levels starting
from (1,1) to (256,256) and with this statistical measurement, we obtain the probability of
joint occurrence of any combination of pixel values (val1 and val2). Joint entropy is then
computed as follows:
E =
∑
val1
∑
val2
pval1val2 log2(pval1val2) (1)
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1. Intuitively, entropy is a measure of randomness. With every iteration of the chaotic
map, the pixel arrangement in an image should become uncorrelated and give a noisy
appearance after a few iterations. This is evident from (Figure 4) where there is a
steep ascent in the Joint Entropy after a few iterations of the map (the first value
in the graph is the Joint Entropy of the original image without any iterations of the
line map algorithm).
2. Weak keys should be avoided. All keys should produce the same ‘amount of random-
ness’. This means that the attacker should not be able to distinguish between two
ciphertexts by their way of permutation or diffusion.
For some transformations like cat map, which exhibit periodicity, the Joint Entropy
function can be used to guess the period of the transformation. We have calculated Joint
Entropy here taking in to account only two adjacent column pixels at a time. But there can
be other ways to do it, like taking two diagonal pixels or two row pixels or sometimes, more
than two pixels at a time to calculate Joint Entropy, which might yield different results
from the ones obtained.
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Figure 4: Variation of Joint Entropy (in bits) with the successive iterations of the line map.
The first value is the Joint Entropy of the original image.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, the security of a recently proposed image encryption scheme has been studied
in detail. It is found that there exist some serious problems with the key scheme, including
weak ones and equivalent ones. The scheme is shown to lack sensitivity to plaintext albeit
possessing sensitivity to changes in the key which makes it vulnerable to differential attacks.
The Joint Entropy function shows some promise for fulfilling the need for a good metric
to quantify the extent of pixel permutation/diffusion in an encrypted image. But more
research needs to be done on the relationship between the number of pixels taken in to
consideration while calculating Joint Entropy and the way it affects the Entropy function,
or how much more information it might give about the encryption scheme.
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Appendix
Composition of numbers
In number theory, a composition of a positive integer n is a way of writing n as a sum of
positive integers. It differs from partition in that, the order of summands is taken in to
account while calculating composition, whereas it is not significant while calculating the
number of partitions. For example, 3 has four compositions namely:
3 = 3
= 2 + 1
= 1 + 2
= 1 + 1 + 1
9
Cryptanalysis of the Line map
Number of Compositions
Theorem:
Any positive number N can have 2N−1 compositions. [20]
Proof:
Let us find the number of compositions of a number N . We can write N as the sum of N
ones, or (N − 2) ones and a 2, (N − 3) ones and a 3 and so on. To generalize this problem,
we can say we have to write N as a sum of K parts, where K varies from 0 to N . This is
essentially a combinatorial problem of the number of ways of choosing K objects, given N
objects, where Ngeq1. Such a choice can be made in
(
N−1
K−1
)
ways. So the total number of
ways in which a composition of the number N can be written is:
N∑
K=1
(
N − 1
K − 1
)
= 2N−1 (2)
Also, from combinatorics we know that:
N∑
K=0
(
N
K
)
= 2N (3)
which gives a complete proof to the expression for number of compositions of the number
N .
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